Bonds, pricing, and work
Users offer native ETH; solvers compete on XMR delivered. The contract charges no protocol fee. Ethereum gas, Monero fees, and proving costs are separate expenses.
ETH accounting
Section titled “ETH accounting”For principal P, the deployed bond is B = floor(P × 500 / 10,000) wei. For example, 0.01 ETH requires a 0.0005 ETH bond. Tiny principals can round the bond to zero; solver policies impose their own economic minimums.
| Outcome | ETH payout |
|---|---|
| Successful settlement | P + B to the winning solver |
| No bids, then expiry | P to the user |
| Winner misses settlement, then expiry | P + B to the user |
| A solver is outbid | Its bond is returned through a bounded-gas call |
The winner recovers its own bond as part of settlement. An outbid refund that fails remains trapped; final payout failure reverts the terminal action.
Solver incentives
Section titled “Solver incentives”Profit depends on XMR acquisition, transaction and proof fees, inventory lockup, and failure risk. The example solver applies a price multiplier and fixed deduction; see pricing and admission.
The bond penalizes missing settlement. It cannot force participation or guarantee performance after an adverse price move. Operator spending caps and profitability estimates govern that solver’s exposure.
Work and value
Section titled “Work and value”An accepted proof returns the winning bond, so the bond adds no penalty to a successful fabricated-payment attack. Qualifying work may cover several distinct payments; the contract neither sums their difficulty targets nor caps aggregate value against work.
Assess the total value covered by shared work when selecting a security budget. The security model explains the expected computational cost.